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We examine the pattern of top executive turnover among small non-listed businesses in Japan 
using a unique panel data set of about 25,000 firms for 2001-2007 and find the following. First, 
the likelihood of a change in top executive among non-listed firms is independent of their 
ex-ante performance, especially when the firms are owned by the top executives themselves or 
by their relatives. Second, non-listed firms which experienced a top executive turnover saw an 
improvement in ex-post performance relative to firms without turnover. The extent of the 
improvement is similar between non-listed firms and listed firms. All of the above results 
indicate that underperforming non-listed firms do not face disciplinary pressure to replace their 
executive, but that once new top executives are in place, they exert high managerial effort and 
thus significantly improve their firm’s profitability.
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1. Introduction 
One of the worrying trends for Japan’s economy is that, for many years now, the number of 
firms exiting the market has been considerably greater than the number of firms entering. As a 
result, the total number of firms in Japan has dropped sharply in the past two decades: from 5.35 
million in 1986 to 4.21 million in 2006. Most of the decline can be attributed to the small and 
medium enterprise (SME) sector, where the number of firms has declined from 5.33 million in 
1986 to 4.20 million in 2006. 
One of the primary reasons for the shrinking population of SMEs is thought to be 
difficulties in attaining a smooth transition in management or a smooth transfer of the business 
from aging managers to their successors. The Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (2006) 
estimated that a quarter of all firm exits are explained by the failure to find a new top executive. 
In order to slow down the decline in the firm population, policy responses by the government 
have included a reduction in the inheritance tax for stocks held by owner-managers. This policy 
is designed to facilitate the process of top executive turnover among small businesses.   
An important question in this context, however, is whether present patterns of top 
executive turnover in Japan’s SME sector are efficient. If poor performance is not punished by 
the replacement of firms’ top management or if the profitability of firms with new top 
executives does not improve, the government’s policies to promote smooth managerial 
transition may be misguided. Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to examine 
the determinants of top executive turnovers and their effectiveness in improving the ex-post 
performance of firms, focusing on small businesses in Japan. Many of the previous studies on 
the determinants of top executive turnover, including Kaplan and Minton (1994), Kang and 
Shivdasani (1995), and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997), find that underperforming firms are 
more likely to replace their top executives than well-performing firms. They also find that 
ownership structures affect the turnover sensitivity to firm performance. However, the focus of 
these studies is limited to large listed firms and does not cover small businesses. Another strand 
of literature, which includes Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004), Bennendsen el al. (2007), 
and Perez-Gonzalez (2006), focuses on the ex-post performance of firms that experienced 
managerial turnovers. However, their analyses are again either limited to large public firms 
(Huson et al. (2004)) or to a comparison between types of management turnover rather than a 
comparison between firms that experienced management turnover and those that did not 
(Bennendsen et al. (2007) and Perez-Gonzalez (2006)). 
Our study therefore represents the first attempt to comprehensively examine the causes 
and consequences of managerial turnover among small privately-held business and compare the 
results with those for large public firms. Top executive turnovers among small non-listed firms 
are expected to be quite different from those among large listed firms in the way turnovers are 3 
 
determined and the way they affect firms’ performance. First, most small non-listed firms are 
run by owner-managers, while only a small minority of large listed firms are owned by their 
managers. When there is an effective external control threat by outside shareholders, this threat 
is likely to raise the probability that poorly performing top executives are replaced by other, 
more competent executives. However, managerial ownership reduces the relative importance of 
outside shareholders, insulates firms from such external controls, and eventually allows 
inefficient incumbent executives to stay in the firm. Managerial ownership may also result in 
insufficient performance improvements since it constrains the choice of succeeding managers to 
a limited pool of managerial talent. 
Second, the shares of small privately-held firms are illiquid since they are not listed on 
the stock market and some of the external control mechanisms which require frequent market 
transactions are not applicable. For example, non-listed firms rarely face a threat of takeover 
which might lead directors to take disciplinary action, including the replacement of managers. 
Note, however, that certain other control mechanisms are still effective for non-listed firms, 
such as controls by the banks that extend loans to such firms. As suggested by Diamond (1984) 
in his theoretical model, banks are able to engage in monitoring activities as a delegated monitor 
and exert external controls over borrowing firms, including the replacement of incumbent 
managers. 
Employing a unique panel data set of about 25,000 small non-listed firms for 
2001-2007 as well as a panel data set of about 2,200 large listed firms for the same period, this 
paper provides two strands of analysis. First, we examine the determinants of top executive 
turnover, including firm characteristics, executive characteristics, managerial ownership, and 
bank-firm relationships. Second, we examine the ex-post performance of firms that experienced 
top executive turnover in comparison with that of firms that did not experience such turnover. 
We compare these two groups of firms using a matching estimation method. 
We find that the likelihood of a change in top executives among non-listed firms is 
independent of their ex-ante performance, especially in the case of firms that are owned by top 
executives themselves or by their relatives. This contrasts with the finding that the management 
turnover likelihood among listed firms is negatively associated with their performance. We also 
find that non-listed firms that experienced a top executive turnover subsequently performed 
better than firms with no turnover. Moreover, the extent of performance improvements 
following managerial replacements is similar for small non-listed firms and large listed firms. 
All of the above indicate that non-listed firms, most of which are operated by owner-managers, 
do not experience disciplinary executive turnovers when they underperform. This is in sharp 
contrast with listed firms, which face a significant increase in the likelihood of management 
replacement when they underperform. However, once new top executives assume the 4 
 
presidency of these non-listed firms, they exert high managerial effort and, as in the case of their 
listed counterpart, improve the firm’s performance. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the previous literature and 
presents the empirical hypotheses. Section 3 then describes the data and the empirical approach 
used for the analysis, while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Empirical Hypotheses 
Regarding the literature on top executive turnovers, one strand of research examines the 
determinants of these turnovers. Previous studies focus on disciplinary events such as a 
downturn of firms’ business and examine if the probability of executive turnover is higher 
among underperforming firms. Many previous studies, concentrating on a variety of countries 
including the United States, Germany, and Japan, point to a significant association between poor 
performance and a higher incidence of management replacements.
4 The pioneering studies on 
Japanese firms are Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995). Analyzing the 
likelihood of outside board member appointments, Kaplan and Minton found that outside 
members previously employed by banks or other, non-financial firms are more frequently 
appointed as board members when the firm’s stock performance is poor. They also found that 
these appointments subsequently increase the turnover of top executives within the firm. 
Meanwhile, Kang and Shivdasani examined the relationship between top executive turnover and 
firm performance and found that the likelihood of turnover is significantly related to 
industry-adjusted returns on assets, excess stock returns, and negative operating income. 
Unfortunately, not only in the case of studies on Japan but also those on other 
countries, the scope of the analysis of the determinants of executive turnover is limited to large 
listed firms and small non-listed enterprises are not included. From the disciplinary point of 
view, small privately-held enterprises differ from large listed firms in two ways. First, most 
small non-listed firms are operated by owner-managers, while only a small minority of large 
listed firms are run by the owner-mangers. On the one hand, managerial ownership has a 
positive aspect in that it increases the power of top executives with sizable voting power and 
better aligns the interests of the two different groups of top managers and shareholders. Since 
agency problems are alleviated by managerial ownership, this is likely to increase the value of 
the firm. On the other hand, managerial equity ownership has negative implications for external 
control over the firm. Firms with owner-managers are insulated from external controls and thus 
can retain underperforming incumbent executives. Second, private firms whose shares are not 
traded on the stock market are less likely to face the threat of takeovers posed by external 
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controls than public firms. Shares issued by private firms are illiquid and some of the means to 
gain external control of a firm including takeover bids are difficult to exercise. Therefore, 
private firms are less likely to be pressured into replacing their management even when they 
underperform. In sum, for small non-listed firms, which are in most cases managed by their 
owners, we arrive at the following hypothesis on top executive turnover. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Top executive turnover for small non-listed firms is less sensitive to their 
performance than for large publicly listed firms. 
 
A related empirical hypothesis regarding the determinants of executive turnover 
concerns the effect of firms’ governance mechanism. Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) report that 
the probability of top executive turnover is inversely related to the ownership stake of officers 
and directors. What Denis, Denis and Sarin found for large listed firms in the United States may 
also apply to non-listed firms with outside managers. Along a similar vein, Kang and Shivdasani, 
focusing on the role of large shareholders and banks, found that the sensitivity of turnovers to 
firms’ performance is higher for firms with ties to main banks than those without such ties. In 
addition, they found that successors are more likely to come from outside the firm when firms 
have large shareholders and a main bank relationships. The role played by banks and corporate 
shareholders is also emphasized by Kaplan and Minton (1994), who show that underperforming 
firms are more likely to appoint outside board members from banks and non-financial 
corporations. What all these studies suggest is that outside shareholders, especially large ones, 
and main banks provide external control mechanisms for the governance of firms. Thus, these 
studies suggest the following hypothesis regarding the role of outside shareholders and main 
banks. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A separation of ownership and management as well as close bank-firm 
relationships increase the sensitivity of top executive turnover to firm performance. 
 
Another strand of literature, including Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004), mostly concentrate 
on publicly listed firms and concerns their performance after managerial turnovers. They 
examine the relationship between CEO turnover and firms’ financial performance and contrast 
two hypotheses regarding firms’ ex-post performance: the improved management hypothesis 
and the “scapegoat” hypothesis. The former states that management turnovers are likely to 
improve managerial quality and therefore ex-post performance. In contrast, the latter holds that 
firm performance has little to do with managerial quality and that managerial turnovers make no 
difference in ex-post firm performance. Comparing turnover and non-turnover firms, Huson, 6 
 
Malatesta, and Parrino find a greater subsequent improvement in performance for turnover than 
for non-turnover firms and infer that the turnover improved managerial quality and this in turn 
positively contributed to firm performance. However, we should note that there may be 
differences in terms of the pool of available managerial talent between large listed firms and 
small non-listed businesses. Partly due to their small size, and partly due to the implicit 
constraint that succeeding executives must come from the family of the owner, non-listed firms 
may be limited in the extent to which they can improve the quality of their management 
following executive turnover.
5 Based on the above discussion, we posit the following 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The ex-post performance of small non-listed firms experiencing management 
turnover improves relative to that of firms experiencing no such turnover. However, the extent 
of improvement is less sizable among small non-listed firms than among large public firms. 
 
 
3. Data Set and Empirical Approach 
3.1 Data 
We construct a firm-level panel data set to analyze the determinants of top executive turnover 
and the ex-post performance of firms that experienced executive turnover. Our data set consists 
of firms that responded to the Surveys of the Financial Environment (SFE) implemented by the 
Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (SMEA) of Japan in 2001-2003. For each SFE, a 
representative sample of 15,000 firms was randomly selected and sent questionnaires. The 
number of responding firms for each of the years was 7,656, 8,446, and 8,040, respectively. For 
each of these firms, we then added data from the Financial Information Database (FID) which 
covers the years 2001-2007 and is collated by Tokyo Shoko Research, Inc., a commercial credit 
research firm. The FID contains the balance sheet and income statements of firms as well as 
information on other firm characteristics. These include the name and age of the representative 
of a firm, the year/month that he/she assumed the presidency, the names of major stockholders, 
the names of the banks each firm transacted with, and whether the firm is listed or not. 
For our analysis, we need information for at least three periods in order to examine the 
determinants of top executive turnover and the effect of turnovers on firms’ ex-post performance. 
That is, we need to know whether the top executive of a firm changed between year t-1 and t 
and the development of the firm’s performance between year t and t+1. In practice, in order to 
measure firms’ ex-post performance, it may be preferable to use more data points than t+1, and 
we actually have data for t+2 and t+3 for the analysis. Using this information, we estimate a 
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probit model that takes account of the various factors that are likely to affect whether firms 
replace their top executive. Further, using the data for year t and t+i, where i=1, 2, 3, we 
measure the effect of top executive turnover on firms’ ex-post performance by observing the 
difference between firms that experienced executive turnover and those that did not.   
Using seven years of data, we construct three panel data sets for the years 2001-2005, 
2002-2006, and 2003-2007. We then concatenate these three data sets into one panel data set. 
The initial year of each panel data set is labeled year t-1, the second year is year t, and the final 
year is year t+3. We add dummies representing the initial year in order to distinguish these three 
panel data sets with different starting years. For our analysis, we exclude the following 
observations from our data set. First, observations where any of the variables calculated as 
ratios in the analysis (described in the next subsection) fall into either the upper or lower 1 
percentile of the total distribution were omitted from the sample. Next, based on the information 
on each firm’s listing status in 2004, the data set is divided into two: a data set consisting of 
non-listed, privately-held firms and a data set consisting of listed firms. Note that our main 
focus is on the non-listed firms and the information on listed firms is mainly used for 
comparison with non-listed firms. 
After screening our data as aforementioned, we are left with 25,290 observations of 
private firms and 2,198 observations of publicly listed firms. Among them, 1,526 and 284 firms 
respectively experienced a top executive turnover in the years 2002-2004. This implies that the 
top executive of the rest of the firms was unchanged. Note here that turnover rates differ 
significantly depending on whether firms are run by owner-managers or not. The turnover rate is 
high in the case of firms managed by outside top executives, while it is low in the case of firms 
run by owner-managers. 
 
(Insert Table 1) 
 
Table 1 shows the numbers of turnovers and the corresponding turnover rates for our 
data set. For the sample of non-listed firms, the turnover rate within one year is 6.0 percent, 
while for the sample of listed firms it is 12.9 percent. Furthermore, the most significant 
difference in terms of turnover rates can be found between firms run by outside executives and 
those run by owner-managers: Using a dummy variable to proxy managerial ownership of a 
firm that takes a value of one if the last name of the firm’s top executive matches at least one of 
the last names of major shareholders and zero otherwise, we find that for firms with managerial 
ownership, the turnover rate is 3.5 percent, while in the case of firms run by outside managers, 





(Insert Table 2) 
 
This section presents a detailed description of the variables used in the analysis. Definitions are 
provided in Table 2. First, in order to distinguish whether a firm replaces its top executive or not 
in a year, we use a binary variable labeled TURNOVER. Turning to explanatory variables, the 
first category measures firms’ performance and includes the return on assets (ROA) and the 
capital ratio (CAP). The second category also measures firms’ performance, but focuses on 
whether a firm is in financial distress. Variables in this category are a dummy for a default 
(DEFAULT), a dummy for a negative ROA (ROA_NG), meaning that the firm is in deficit, a 
dummy for interest coverage being less than or equal to unity (ICOVER_SM), meaning that the 
operating profit is insufficient to cover interest expenses, and a dummy for a negative capital 
ratio (CAP_NG), that is, the firm has negative net worth. The third category measures the credit 
availability for a firm using the ratio of long-term loans (LONG) and short-term loans (SHORT) 
to the total asset amount. In addition, to measure firms’ liquidity, the ratio of cash and deposits 
to the total asset amount (CASH) is used. Further, the ratio of interest payments to the total loan 
amount outstanding (RATE) is used, with a higher ratio indicating that credit is more limited. 
Note, however, that these variables are also affected by the demand for credit and do not 
necessarily represent the availability of funds. The fourth category consists of variables that 
control for firm age (FIRMAGE), firm size (LnEMP), and the demand for funds for capital 
investment (FIXED). Note that the variable LnEMP is also a proxy for the size of the human 
resources pool from which incumbent executives choose their successors. The fifth category is 
made up of variables representing the characteristics of top executives in terms of their age 
(AGE) and tenure (TENURE), i.e., the number of years they have served in their current 
managerial position. The final category of variables measures the extent of external control of a 
firm. As a proxy for managerial ownership, a binary variable representing whether a family 
member of the top executive is a major shareholder (OWNERSHIP) is used. Managerial 
ownership is expected to reduce the external pressure on the incumbent management. In 
addition, to consider another potential source of external control, namely financial institutions, a 
variable indicating whether the bank listed first by a firm in the FID is also a major shareholder 
(MAINBANK).
 6 Most of the firms in the sample have established lending relationships with 
banks. However, a certain number of firms in the sample receive not only loans but also equity 
from these banks, suggesting a certain degree of outside control. 
                                                  




3.3 Empirical Approach 
Using the data set just described, we proceed to examine the three hypotheses stated in Section 
2. Note, however, that a simple comparison of the ex-post performance of firms that 
experienced a top executive turnover and those that did not is inappropriate because of possible 
selection bias. For example, if firms with an executive turnover are riskier than those without, 
then a simple comparison of the ex-post performance between these two groups confounds 
ex-ante riskiness and ex-post riskiness (changes in borrowers’ riskiness after the top executive 
turnover). To circumvent this problem, we need to control for any possible selection bias in our 
estimation. To do so, we employ a matching estimation approach. The procedure is as follows: 
 
(i) We implement a probit estimation that models the probability of top executive turnover in 
year  t conditional on covariates observed in year t-1. Firms that experience turnover 
( 1  t TURNOVER ) are labeled treatment observations. We then attach a propensity score to each 
observation. The propensity score    e   is defined as 
 
  1 1 1 Pr     t t t X TURNOVER X e , (1) 
 
where  1  t X   is a vector of covariates in the probit estimation. We focus on privately-held firms 
and implement baseline estimations. We also implement another set of estimations for public 
firms, which we call reference estimations. 
 
(ii) Next, we implement another set of probit estimations including cross terms multiplied by the 
variables measuring the extent of external control of a firm, MAINBANK and OWNERSHIP. We 
implement estimations not only for non-listed firms but also for public firms. Estimations of (i) 
and (ii) are used to examine Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 
(iii) For each treatment observation, we identify matched observations from the sample of firms 
without turnover. The matched observations are those that have the “closest” propensity scores 
to a particular treatment observation and are labeled control observations. These matched 
observations are chosen from the same calendar year as the treatment observation. It should also 
be noted that we use a non-treated observation more than once as a control, that is, a 
non-treatment observation may be used as a control for one treatment observation and as a 
control for another treatment observation at the same time. There are several matching 
algorithms to find the “closest” control observations. As a base-line for our analysis, we employ 10 
 
k-nearest matching, in which the arbitrarily determined k observations whose propensity scores 
are the closest to each treatment observation are chosen.
7  
 
(iv) Finally, we compare the change (yearly difference) in the ex-post performance variables of 
the treatment and the control group from year t to years t+1, t+2, and t+3. To be precise, to test 
Hypothesis 3, we use the difference-in-difference (DID) estimator regarding firms’ ex-post 




i t Y Y       
and  Y  indicates the performance variable and uppercase  T  and C  stand for the treatment 
and the control group, respectively. In our analysis, the DID estimator is superior to the 
traditional matching estimators in that time-invariant biases before and after executive turnovers 
are differenced out between the treatment. and the control group.
8 
 
One of the benefits of employing propensity score matching estimation is that we can 
match treatment and control observations using the scalar propensity score. The propensity 
score, which is the conditional probability of being treated given the value of observed 
characteristics, is a very useful variable in dealing with a highly dimensional vector of 
covariates. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that treatment observations (in our case firms 
that experienced a turnover) and control observations (firms that did not experience a turnover) 
with the same propensity score value have the same distribution of the full vector of covariates. 
It is thus sufficient to match firms in terms of the propensity score in order to obtain the same 
probability distribution of covariates for treatment and control observations. 
In propensity score matching, an assumption known as unconfoundedness has to be 
satisfied so that the differences in ex-post performance variables between the treatment 
observations and the control observations with the same values for covariates are attributable to 
the treatment effect of changing their top executive. That is,   
 




i t X TURNOVER Y Y  (2) 
 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that assumption (2) is identical to the following condition: 
 




i t X e TURNOVER Y Y  (3) 
                                                  
7 In this paper we use k=5. Because the results of our estimation may be sensitive to the matching algorithm we 
choose, as a robustness check, in Appendix Table 2, we also report results using different matching algorithms: 
10-nearest matching, radius matching, and kernel matching. We find that the results are similar to those with the 
5-nearest matching. 
8  Regarding the superiority of the DID estimator, see, e.g., Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998). 11 
 
 
Although there is no direct test for unconfoundedness, this assumption indicates the need to 
control for all relevant variables  1  t X  that influence treatment assignments and ex-post 
performance variables. We believe that our data is rich enough to include the necessary 
covariates. Furthermore, the DID matching estimator that we use allows for the existence of 
differences in time-invariant unobservable characteristics between the treatment and the control 
group. 
In addition to unconfoundedness, the following balancing condition of pretreatment 
variables given the propensity score must be satisfied (Becker and Ichino (2002)). 
 
 1 1    t t t X e X TURNOVER  (4) 
 
In other words, for a given propensity score, treatment observations are randomly chosen, and 
therefore, the treatment sample and the non-treated sample are on average identical. 
  In order to verify that (4) holds, we implement the following testing procedure after 
the first step of the matching observation: (i) based on the estimated probit model, we split the 
sample such that the average propensity scores of the treated and non-treated groups do not 
differ, and (ii) within all intervals, test that the means of every element of  1  t X  do not differ 
significantly between treated and non-treated observations. If there are no statistically 
significant differences between the two, then we can proceed to estimate the treatment effect in 
the second step with some confidence. In our estimation for the treatment effects to be presented 




4.1 Determinants of Top Executive Turnovers 
We start with the baseline probit estimation. Table 3 lists the means of the variables we use in 
this estimation. 
 
(Insert Table 3) 
 
In the probit estimation we obtain conditional probabilities of a firm changing its top executive 
in year t given the values of observed firm performance, financial distress, credit availability, 
and other firm characteristics in year t-1. The dependent binary variable represents a turnover of 
the top executive in year t ( t TURNOVER ). The following explanatory variables are used. First, 12 
 
regarding firm performance, the return on total assets ( 1  t ROA ) to measure firms’ annual profits 
and the capital-asset ratio ( 1  t CAP ) to measure firms’ net worth are employed. Given the 
possibility that managerial turnovers may occur more frequently in times of financial distress, 
we use one dummy variable indicating whether the capital ratio is negative ( 1 _  t NG CAP ). The 
next set of explanatory variables focuses on firms’ credit availability conditions. We include the 
long-term borrowing ratio ( 1  t LONG ), the short-term borrowing ratio ( 1  t SHORT ), liquidity as 
measured by the cash and deposit to asset ratio ( 1  t CASH ), and the interest payment rate 
( 1  t RATE ). In addition, we use variables on other firm characteristics, including firm age 
( 1  t FIRMAGE ), firm size expressed in terms of the log of the number of employees ( 1  t LnEMP ), 
and the ratio of fixed tangible assets to total assets ( 1  t FIXED ). We also employ variables on the 
characteristics of top executives, including the age of the top executive ( 1  t AGE ) and his/her 
years of tenure ( 1  t TENURE ). Finally, we include the proxy for the managerial ownership 
( 1  t OWNERSHIP ) and the main bank relationship ( 1  t MAINBANK ). 
 
(Insert Table 4) 
 
The baseline probit estimation results on top executive turnovers are presented in 
Table 4. In the estimation for non-listed firms, there are several significant coefficients. First, 
the performance variables  1  t ROA and  1  t CAP  are negative and weakly significant. This 
indicates that badly performing firms are more likely to change their top executive than 
well-performing firms. Next, one of the variables indicating credit availability conditions, 
1  t LONG , is negative and significant, which indicates that financially constrained firms facing a 
limited availability of long-term loans are more likely to change their top executive. 
1  t LnEMP has a positive and significant coefficient indicating that larger firms with abundant 
human resources and hence a larger pool of potential successors to the top executive tend to 
replace their executive more frequently than other firms. The age of the outgoing top executive 
( 1  t AGE ) and his/her years of tenure ( 1  t TENURE ) are positive and significant, indicating that 
older top executives who have been president for many years are more likely to be replaced. 
Finally, the sign on  1  t OWNERSHIP  is negative and significant, while that on  1  t MAINBANK  
is positive but insignificant. 
In order to compare non-listed private firms with publicly listed firms, we also 
conducted a reference estimation results for publicly listed firms and the results are shown in the 
right-hand column of Table 4. As can be seen, there are only a few variables with significant 
coefficients, including 1  t ROA , 1  t AGE , and  1  t OWNERSHIP . The coefficient on  1  t ROA  is 
significantly negative and its marginal effect on the turnover probability is more sizable than in 
the case of non-listed firms. For  1  t AGE  and  1  t OWNERSHIP , the signs of the coefficients are 13 
 
the same as those for non-listed firms.   
Regarding Hypothesis 1, which suggests that executive turnover in small firms is less 
sensitive to firm performance, the results thus far are rather mixed. On the one hand, and in line 
with the hypothesis, the turnover probability is less sensitive to firm profitability ( 1  t ROA ) 
among non-listed private firms than among publicly listed firms; on the other hand, though, it is 
more sensitive to firms’ net worth ( 1  t CAP ) among non-listed than among listed firms. Further, 
we have not yet closely examined Hypothesis 2, which predicts that the variables 
1  t OWNERSHIP  and  1  t MAINBANK  affect the sensitivity of managerial turnover to firm 
performance. Hence, we will examine these two hypotheses with a more detailed specification. 
 
(Insert Table 5) 
 
In the next probit estimation, we introduce cross terms in which each of the 
explanatory variables representing firm performance are multiplied by 1  t OWNERSHIP  in  order 
to examine if their parameters are significantly affected by firms’ managerial ownership. Note 
that we first focus on  1  t OWNERSHIP  and its cross terms only rather than focusing on both 
1  t OWNERSHIP  and  1  t MAINBANK and their respective cross terms, since  1  t MAINBANK  is 
insignificant in the previous estimation and we do not expect to obtain meaningful statistical 
inferences from the estimation by including  1  t MAINBANK as an explanatory variable. The 
estimation results for non-listed and listed firms are shown in the left- and right-hand columns 
of Table 5, respectively. There are important differences between Tables 4 and 5 in terms of the 
results for the performance variables for non-listed firm.  1  t ROA becomes insignificant in Table 
5, while it was negative and significant in Table 4, implying that a decrease in profits has no 
significant impact on the probability of top executive turnover. Moreover, in Table 5, the sign of 
the coefficient on  1  t CAP becomes significantly negative, while that of the coefficient on 
1 1 *   t t OWNERSHIP CAP  is significantly positive. This indicates that a lower capital ratio 
increases the likelihood of management turnover among firms without managerial ownership, 
while it does not have a significant impact on the likelihood of management turnover among 
firms  with managerial ownership. In contrast, the introduction of the cross terms does not 
significantly affect the estimation results for listed firms. As in Table 4, we observe a negative 
and significant coefficient on 1  t ROA in Table 5, indicating that the top executive turnover 
likelihood increases among underperforming listed firms. Hence, by introducing additional 
explanatory variables, we find a significant difference between non-listed firms and listed firms 
in terms of the response to the firm’s performance, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. We 
also find that the separation of ownership and management in non-listed firms increases the 
sensitivity of top executive turnover to firms’ net worth, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. 14 
 
Regarding the examination of another part of Hypothesis 2, that is, the role of 
bank-firm relationships, we find no significant changes in the turnover sensitivity to firm 
performance. We introduce another probit estimation that includes both  1  t OWNERSHIP  and 
1  t MAINBANK as well as their respective cross terms with performance variables. The results 
are shown in Table 6 and are qualitatively similar to those in Table 5 in that all the newly 
introduced variables, that is,  1  t MAINBANK and its cross terms, are statistically insignificant. 
Thus, we fail to find evidence suggesting that bank-firm relationships play a role in affecting the 
sensitivity of top executive turnover to firm performance as Hypothesis 2 predicts. 
 
(Insert Table 6) 
 
On balance, regarding the relationship between performance and top executive 
turnover among non-listed firms, disciplinary pressure seems to be weaker among non-listed 
firms than listed firms. Furthermore, for non-listed firms with managerial ownership, the 
disciplinary pressure becomes even weaker. The only exception is when firms run by outside 
managers observe a decrease in their net worth. In this case, firms tend to replace their top 
executive more frequently than firms that does not experience a decrease in net worth. These 
results contrast with the results for the listed firms in which managerial turnovers are always 
significantly associated with firms’ poor performance. Hence, in general, we can say that the 
results of our empirical analysis support Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 
4.2 Effects on Ex-post Firm Performance 
Having obtained the propensity score for each observation, we match each treatment 
observation of a firm that experienced a top executive turnover in year t with control 
observations of firms that did not experience a turnover in that year. There are 1,526 treatment 
observations that experienced a turnover. We choose five neighboring control observations for 
each treatment observation in the same calendar year in terms of the distance measured by the 
propensity scores. We employ the specification of the probit estimation underlying Table 5 and 
calculate the propensity scores based on its parameters.
9 
For these treatment and control observations that are matched, in order to examine 
Hypothesis 3, we use several variables to measure the change in borrowers’ performance 
between year t and year t+i, where i = 1, 2, 3. For both the treatment and the control group, the 
change in the performance variables is measured by
j




i t ROA ROA    , 
j
i t CAP  , and 
j
i t ICOVER   , where  } , { C T j   and T and C stand for the treatment and the control group, 
                                                  
9  We employ a different set of propensity scores based on the specification of the probit estimation underlying Table 
4 as a robustness check. The results, presented in Appendix Table 1, show no qualitative difference from those in 
Table 7. 15 
 
respectively. We examine the change in the probability of financial distress. We use several 
ways to define borrower financial distress, including default, a negative ROA, interest coverage 
less than or equal to unity, and a negative capital ratio. We measure the probability of a firm 
falling into a certain type of distress and then take the difference in this probability between year 
t and year t+i. Hence, the change in distress probabilities is measured 
by ) 1 (    DEFAULT p
j
i t ,
10 ) 1 _ (    NG ROA p
j
i t , ) 1 _ (    SM ICOVER p
j
i t , and 
) 1 _ (    NG CAP p
j
i t , where  } , { C T j  . Furthermore, we measure the change in several other 
variables describing firms’ circumstances, including credit availability conditions (
j
i t LONG   , 
j
i t SHORT   ,  
j
i t CASH    
j
i t RATE   ), the fixed tangible assets ratio (
j
i t FIXED   ), sales 
(
j
i t SALES   ), and employment (
j
i t EMP  ). 
 
(Insert Table 7) 
 
Turning to the results, we begin with the treatment effect of top executive turnover 
among non-listed firms, which is shown in the central column labeled “DID.” Among the firm 
performance variables, 
T
t ROA 2    is significantly higher, by 0.3 percentage points, than 
C
t ROA 2    and 
T
t CAP 3    is significantly higher, by 0.7 percentage points, than 
C
t CAP 3   . 
Regarding the financial distress variables,  ) 1 ( 3    DEFAULT p
T
t ,  ) 1 _ ( 2    NG ROA p
T
t , and 
) 1 _ ( 2    SM ICOVER p
T
t are significantly lower than  ) 1 ( 3    DEFAULT p
C
t ,  
) 1 _ ( 2    NG ROA p
C
t , and  ) 1 _ ( 2    SM ICOVER p
C
t , by 0.4, 3.4, and 3.9 percentage points, 
respectively. These results indicate that firms that experienced a management turnover are less 
likely to suffer from financial distresses than those that did not. [Interestingly, the better firm 
performance among non-listed firms is accompanied by a decreased dependence on long-term 
loans, shrinking sales, and lower employment.   
Next, we look at the treatment effect of top executive turnover among listed firms. We 
find that listed firms that have experienced an executive turnover saw an increase in their 
profitability and a decrease in their probability of falling into financial distress, indicating that 
executive turnovers improve firms’ performance. In contrast with the case of non-listed firms, 
this increasing profitability is accompanied by a reduced dependence on fixed tangible assets 
rather than by lower employment. 
  In sum, in the predictions of Hypothesis 3 do not seem to be supported. That is, we fail 
to find conclusive evidence that managerial turnovers improve the firm performance of large 
listed firms more than that of small non-listed firms. Instead, we find that both non-listed firms 
and listed firms experience a significant improvement in their profitability when a top executive 
                                                  
10  Since we do not have data on defaults in year t,  ) 1 ( 1    DEFAULT p
j
t  is  actually ) 1 ( 1   DEFAULT p
j
t . 16 
 
turnover occurs. One of the few differences among the two groups of firms is that non-listed 
firms significantly reduce their sales and employment after a top executive turnover, while listed 




In this paper, we examined the process of top executive turnover in small non-listed businesses 
in Japan using a unique panel data set of about 25,000 firms in 2001-2007. Consistent with our 
first and second hypotheses, the likelihood of a change in top executives of non-listed firms is 
independent of their ex-ante performance, especially when the firms are operated by the owners 
themselves or by their relatives. Also, non-listed firms which experienced a top executive 
turnover saw an improvement in their ex-post performance relative to firms with no turnover. 
Moreover, the extent of the improvement in firm performance following an executive turnover 
is similar for non-listed and listed firms, a result that is in conflict with our third hypothesis. All 
of these results suggest that underperforming non-listed firms do not face the threat of 
disciplinary executive turnover. However, when a turnover does take place, firms profitability 
improves significantly, suggesting that the new top executives exert high managerial effort.   
The improvement in the performance of non-listed firms that experienced managerial 
turnover provides some evidence that such firms deserve policy assistance. Without any 
assistance, such firms may end up exiting the market, resulting in the potential loss of valuable 
resources such as accumulated intangible assets. Needless to say, for an optimal design of 
policies to facilitate business transfers, it is important to identify and target firms that are likely 
to experience an improvement in business performance as a result. Further, not only the 
relationship between managerial turnover and firm performance, but also how the relationship is 
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Number of Firms 1526 722 804 284 48 236





Table 2: Definitions of Variables 
 
Turnover of Firms’ Top Executive 
 TURNOVER  1 if a new top executive assumes presidency of the firm in the year, 0 
otherwise. 
Firm Performance   
 ROA  Ratio of pre-tax operating profits to total assets. 
 CAP  Ratio of capital to total assets. 
   
Financial Distress   
DEFAULT  1 if a firm defaults, 0 otherwise. 
 ROA_NG  1 if ROA is negative (the borrower is in deficit), 0 otherwise. 
 ICOVER_SM  1 if ICOVER is less than or equal to one, 0 otherwise. 
 CAP_NG  1 if CAP is negative (the borrower has negative net worth),   
0 otherwise. 
   
Credit Availability   
 LONG  Ratio of long-term loans (loans with more than 1 year maturity) to 
total assets. 
   S H O R T   Ratio of short-term loans (loans with less than 1 year maturity) to total 
assets. 
 CASH  Ratio of cash and deposit holdings to total assets. 
 RATE  Ratio on interest expenses to total loan amount. 
   
Other Firm Characteristics 
   FIRMAGE  Number of years since the establishment of the firm. 
   LnEMP  Log of the number of employees. 
 FIXED  Ratio of fixed tangible assets to total assets. 
   
Characteristics of Top Executive 
 AGE  Age of the top executive. 
 TENURE  Number of years the incumbent top executive has been president of 
the firm.   
Governance 
 OWNERSHIP  1 if a family member of the CEO of the firm is a major shareholder, 0 
otherwise. 
 MAINBANK  1 if the bank listed first by the firm is a major shareholder, 0 
otherwise. 
Note: Dummy variables for the industry of the firm are also included in the empirical analysis. 
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ROA(t-1) 0.019 0.018 0.022 0.035 0.049 0.027
(0.055) (0.055) (0.051) (0.046) (0.053) (0.039)
CAP(t-1) 0.234 0.236 0.224 0.388 0.421 0.366
(0.212) (0.212) (0.212) (0.190) (0.186) (0.190)
CAP_NG(t-1) 0.062 0.062 0.061 0
(0.241) (0.241) (0.239)
LONG(t-1) 0.252 0.269 0.177 0.098 0.107 0.093
(0.200) (0.198) (0.189) (0.103) (0.107) (0.101)
SHORT(t-1) 0.160 0.156 0.180 0.116 0.106 0.123
(0.160) (0.157) (0.170) (0.118) (0.111) (0.122)
CASH(t-1) 0.170 0.178 0.134 0.113 0.147 0.091
(0.125) (0.126) (0.112) (0.090) (0.101) (0.073)
RATE(t-1) 0.025 0.026 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.019
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
FIRMAGE(t-1) 39.705 39.887 38.869 50.374 42.861 55.277
(22.306) (22.604) (20.871) (24.408) (23.189) (23.940)
LnEMP(t-1) 3.581 3.406 4.383 6.323 5.831 6.644
(1.321) (1.236) (1.397) (1.235) (0.976) (1.280)
EMP(t-1) 98.2 71.4 221.0 1496.0 542.0 2118.6
(403.701) (160.695) (879.074) (4555.2) (790.970) (5736.917)
FIXED(t-1) 0.303 0.301 0.313 0.308 0.306 0.309
(0.203) (0.198) (0.225) (0.186) (0.183) (0.188)
AGE(t-1) 58.775 58.045 62.120 60.662 56.914 63.108
(9.484) (9.683) (7.676) (8.423) (9.938) (6.140)
TENURE(t-1) 12.591 14.160 5.405 8.280 14.347 4.320
(10.584) (10.590) (6.965) (9.267) (10.438) (5.583)
OWNERSHIP 0.821 1 0 0.395 1 0
(0.384) (0.489)
MAINBANK 0.015 0.007 0.053 0.270 0.232 0.295
(0.121) (0.082) (0.224) (0.444) (0.422) (0.456)
Number of
observations








Table 4: Probit Estimation Results: Baseline 
ROA -0.511 * -2.008 **
(0.285) (0.952)




LONG -0.515 *** -0.261
(0.107) (0.461)












AGE 0.037 *** 0.041 ***
(0.002) (0.006)
TENURE 0.004 ** 0.001
(0.001) (0.005)
























Table 5: Probit Estimation Results: Including OWNERSHIP and Its Cross Terms 
ROA -0.481 -2.584 **
(0.465) (1.143)




LONG -0.491 *** -0.239
(0.108) (0.460)












AGE 0.037 *** 0.041 ***
(0.002) (0.006)
TENURE 0.003 ** 0.001
(0.001) (0.005)








Constant -3.403 *** -3.378 ***
(0.177) (0.508)















Table 6: Probit Estimation Results: Including OWNERSHIP and MAINBANK 
ROA -0.410 -1.969
(0.475) (1.223)




LONG -0.493 *** -0.170
(0.108) (0.458)












AGE 0.037 *** 0.041 ***
(0.002) (0.006)
TENURE 0.003 ** 0.001
(0.001) (0.005)








































ROA t+1 0.024 0.027 0.001 0.030 0.034 0.003
     t+2 0.028 0.029 0.003 * 0.038 0.036 0.005 *
     t+3 0.029 0.030 0.002 0.042 0.038 0.006 **
CAP t+1 0.259 0.271 -0.002 0.385 0.391 0.009
     t+2 0.267 0.279 0.000 0.393 0.393 0.013 *
     t+3 0.280 0.285 0.007 ** 0.405 0.400 0.020 **
ICOVER t+1 19.708 15.190 3.665 * 23.321 23.048 4.969
     t+2 15.359 14.856 1.813 21.872 19.488 8.616
     t+3 16.122 17.149 0.482 14.997 18.255 3.135
p(DEFAULT) t+1 0.000 0.002 -0.002 ** 0.011 0.000 0.011 *
     t+2 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
     t+3 0.000 0.004 -0.004 *** 0.000 0.002 -0.002
p(ROA_NG) t+1 0.183 0.147 -0.010 0.127 0.074 -0.039
     t+2 0.144 0.143 -0.034 ** 0.074 0.084 -0.087 ***
     t+3 0.159 0.137 -0.024 0.068 0.082 -0.087 ***
p(ICOVER_SM) t+1 0.129 0.117 -0.027 ** 0.109 0.055 -0.037
     t+2 0.109 0.118 -0.039 *** 0.071 0.069 -0.077 ***
     t+3 0.135 0.116 -0.024 0.057 0.057 -0.074 ***
p(CAP_NG) t+1 0.040 0.033 0.001 0.011 0.001 -0.009
     t+2 0.036 0.029 0.002 0.004 0.000 -0.015 *
     t+3 0.028 0.029 -0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.019 **
LONG t+1 0.181 0.184 -0.002 0.093 0.082 0.000
     t+2 0.177 0.180 -0.005 0.082 0.079 -0.004
     t+3 0.168 0.176 -0.011 *** 0.080 0.074 -0.002
SHORT t+1 0.159 0.156 -0.001 0.109 0.104 -0.002
     t+2 0.148 0.147 -0.003 0.099 0.093 -0.003
     t+3 0.141 0.139 0.000 0.085 0.087 -0.009
CASH t+1 0.145 0.147 0.002 0.097 0.096 0.003
     t+2 0.140 0.145 0.001 0.099 0.093 0.008 *
     t+3 0.141 0.144 0.002 0.094 0.087 0.010 **
RATE t+1 0.022 0.021 0.000 0.019 0.018 0.001
     t+2 0.021 0.021 0.000 0.019 0.017 0.001
     t+3 0.021 0.021 0.000 0.019 0.017 0.001
FIXED t+1 0.320 0.318 -0.001 0.294 0.285 -0.004
     t+2 0.317 0.314 -0.001 0.282 0.274 -0.007 *
     t+3 0.314 0.313 -0.002 0.275 0.266 -0.009 *
SALES t+1 12639000 13848000 -423222 * 177470000 212520000 -6771800
     t+2 12712000 14350000 -1017900 ** 185730000 225460000 -8930800
     t+3 14087000 14994000 -1013700 * 196550000 237840000 -7808900
EMP t+1 184.8 210.9 -11.6 *** 1826.4 1930.0 -54.8
     t+2 184.8 221.3 -16.2 *** 2074.5 1929.5 220.3
     t+3 189.7 209.5 0.6 1644.1 1943.8 -102.1
















ROA t+1 0.024 0.027 0.001 0.030 0.034 0.002
     t+2 0.028 0.028 0.004 ** 0.038 0.037 0.005 *
     t+3 0.029 0.030 0.003 0.042 0.038 0.006 *
CAP t+1 0.259 0.269 -0.002 0.385 0.372 0.009 *
     t+2 0.267 0.274 0.000 0.393 0.375 0.015 **
     t+3 0.280 0.279 0.007 ** 0.405 0.381 0.022 ***
ICOVER t+1 19.708 15.889 3.683 * 23.321 19.637 5.935
     t+2 15.359 14.149 2.296 21.872 16.578 8.863
     t+3 16.122 16.261 1.169 14.997 14.977 5.692
p(DEFAULT) t+1 0.000 0.001 -0.002 * 0.011 0.001 0.009
     t+2 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
     t+3 0.000 0.003 -0.003 ** 0.000 0.003 -0.003
p(ROA_NG) t+1 0.183 0.148 -0.010 0.127 0.089 -0.049 *
     t+2 0.144 0.143 -0.040 ** 0.074 0.076 -0.073 **
     t+3 0.159 0.136 -0.031 * 0.068 0.081 -0.074 **
p(ICOVER_SM) t+1 0.129 0.105 -0.023 * 0.109 0.078 -0.052 **
     t+2 0.109 0.113 -0.046 *** 0.071 0.064 -0.063 **
     t+3 0.135 0.118 -0.033 ** 0.057 0.062 -0.065 **
p(CAP_NG) t+1 0.040 0.032 0.002 0.011 0.001 -0.005
     t+2 0.036 0.032 -0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.015
     t+3 0.028 0.030 -0.006 0.000 0.002 -0.017 *
LONG t+1 0.181 0.185 -0.002 0.093 0.093 -0.002
     t+2 0.177 0.180 -0.004 0.082 0.090 -0.008 *
     t+3 0.168 0.176 -0.010 *** 0.080 0.088 -0.008
SHORT t+1 0.159 0.157 0.000 0.109 0.114 -0.004
     t+2 0.148 0.148 -0.003 0.099 0.102 -0.004
     t+3 0.141 0.141 -0.001 0.085 0.096 -0.010
CASH t+1 0.145 0.146 0.003 * 0.097 0.094 0.002
     t+2 0.140 0.145 0.003 0.099 0.091 0.007 *
     t+3 0.141 0.142 0.003 0.094 0.087 0.008 *
RATE t+1 0.022 0.022 0.000 0.019 0.019 0.000
     t+2 0.021 0.021 0.000 0.019 0.018 0.001
     t+3 0.021 0.021 0.000 0.019 0.017 0.001
FIXED t+1 0.320 0.320 -0.001 0.294 0.298 -0.005 *
     t+2 0.317 0.316 -0.003 0.282 0.286 -0.009 **
     t+3 0.314 0.316 -0.002 0.275 0.280 -0.011 **
SALES t+1 12639000 14765000 -573558 ** 177470000 192750000 -6916400
     t+2 12712000 16483000 -1417100 *** 185730000 190700000 -7225700
     t+3 14087000 18961000 -2351200 *** 196550000 202660000 -7042400
EMP t+1 184.8 206.7 -7.4 *** 1826.4 1896.2 -66.1
     t+2 184.8 217.5 -9.5 ** 2074.5 1783.3 213.3
     t+3 189.7 203.1 8.1 1644.1 1837.0 -117.6 *






Appendix Table 2: Treatment Effects with Different Matching Algorithms 
 
ROA t+1 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002
     t+2 0.003 * 0.005 * 0.003 ** 0.006 ** 0.003 * 0.006 **
     t+3 0.003 0.006 * 0.003 0.008 *** 0.003 0.007 **
CAP t+1 -0.001 0.009 * -0.001 0.009 * -0.001 0.009 *
     t+2 0.000 0.011 * 0.002 0.012 * 0.001 0.012 **
     t+3 0.005 * 0.018 ** 0.007 ** 0.021 *** 0.006 * 0.022 ***
ICOVER t+1 3.974 ** 5.510 2.998 3.811 3.258 * 4.161
     t+2 2.254 9.797 * 0.309 8.558 0.846 8.710
     t+3 1.438 2.962 0.423 3.245 0.670 2.612
p(DEFAULT) t+1 -0.002 ** 0.011 * -0.002 ** 0.011 * -0.002 ** 0.011 *
     t+2 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
     t+3 -0.004 *** -0.003 -0.003 *** -0.002 * -0.003 *** -0.002 **
p(ROA_NG) t+1 -0.003 -0.038 -0.004 -0.031 -0.004 -0.031
     t+2 -0.030 * -0.083 *** -0.033 ** -0.074 *** -0.033 ** -0.074 ***
     t+3 -0.022 -0.077 *** -0.025 * -0.078 *** -0.024 -0.075 ***
p(ICOVER_SM) t+1 -0.021 -0.039 -0.018 -0.036 -0.018 -0.035
     t+2 -0.035 ** -0.069 *** -0.034 ** -0.065 *** -0.035 ** -0.064 **
     t+3 -0.025 -0.069 ** -0.021 -0.073 *** -0.021 -0.070 ***
p(CAP_NG) t+1 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.007 0.002 -0.007
     t+2 0.002 -0.013 0.001 -0.014 0.001 -0.014
     t+3 -0.004 -0.017 ** -0.003 -0.018 ** -0.003 -0.018 **
LONG t+1 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
     t+2 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 * -0.005 -0.005 * -0.006
     t+3 -0.010 ** -0.002 -0.010 *** -0.003 -0.010 *** -0.004
SHORT t+1 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
     t+2 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
     t+3 0.000 -0.007 -0.001 -0.011 * 0.000 -0.009
CASH t+1 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001
     t+2 0.001 0.007 * 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006
     t+3 0.001 0.009 ** 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.007
RATE t+1 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
     t+2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
     t+3 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
FIXED t+1 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 * -0.001 -0.004
     t+2 -0.001 -0.007 * -0.002 -0.008 ** -0.001 -0.007 *
     t+3 -0.001 -0.009 * -0.002 -0.010 ** -0.001 -0.009 **
SALES t+1 -541242 ** -7522100 * -451416 * -8073200 ** -477759 ** -7684600 *
     t+2 -1297900 *** -9414600 -927111 ** -7644300 -1041700 *** -7457300
     t+3 -1469000 ** -8126600 -1131700 ** -5825200 -1368600 *** -5935400
EMP t+1 -9.4 *** -102.8 -5.2 *** -149.1 ** -5.0 *** -141.1 **
     t+2 -15.5 *** 189.2 -8.2 *** 173.8 -8.2 *** 183.0
     t+3 1.1 -127.3 * -3.9 -143.4 ** -2.3 -134.1 **
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